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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Since only one cause of action is created where personal injuries and
property damage result from the same wrongful act,54 application of
general res judicata principles precludes the plaintiff from prosecuting
the initial suit.
A valid and final judgment rendered in one action is conclusive
in another action between the parties although the other action was com-
menced before the rendition of the judgment or before the commence-
ment of the action in which the judgment was rendered.55
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
DOMICILE
Riss & Co. v. Bowers1 applies to motor vehicle registration laws the
well-known principle that the domicile of a corporation is the state of its
incorporation.'
CUSTODY
Another example of the intolerable battle between divorced or sepa-
rated parents for the custody of their children is found in the case of
Ex parte Elliott.3 Although, strictly speaking, the court successfully and
justifiably side-steps the full faith and credit issue and determines the
matter on the basis of the child's welfare, the opinion does contain valu-
able material about jurisdiction in and recognition of custody proceedings.
For instance, the court pointed out that where the mother and children
were living in Kentucky pursuant to a separation agreement, an Ohio
court has no jurisdiction to cancel the separation agreement and award
custody to the father, domiciled in Ohio, in the absence of jurisdiction
in personam over the mother. This is so despite the fact that the father
has brought the children back to Ohio.
Subsequently, the mother moved to Maryland, and, with the father's
consent, took the children there for a visit. She did not bring them back.
The father went to Maryland, and the mother commenced an action in
Maryland for custody of the children, getting personal service on the
father. A few days later, the children were released temporarily to the
father under bond, and he returned to Ohio with them. The Maryland
court gave custody of the children to the mother. The Ohio court in the
case under review held that under the circumstances, the Maryland court
had jurisdiction to decree custody. But the Ohio court said that the effect
54. Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 NYE2d 599 (1958).
55. RBsTATEMENT, JuDGmNTs 5 43 (1942).
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of the full faith and credit clause on such a decree has not been dearly
defined, although the probable rule is that such a judgment must be
recognized in another state in the absence of changed circumstances. In
view of the uncertainty of the law, and in order to promote the welfare
of the children, the court decided the case on the merits.
CONDITIONAL SALES OF AUTOMOBILES
Atlantic Finance Co. v. Fisher4 is an important case interpreting the
Ohio law concerning automobile certificates of title.5 Technically, the
case involves merely the interpretation of an Ohio statute, and is not
really a conflict of laws case, but it is so closely related that it should be
mentioned.
An Illinois certificate of title showed title in S and a first lien in
plaintiff, a finance company. A thief stole the car in Illinois, brought
it to Ohio, and obtained an Ohio certificate of title which showed no liens.
The car was sold to innocent purchasers for value in Ohio, who financed
their purchase through defendant. Despite the fact that the Ohio cer-
tificate of title was "clean," the court ruled in favor of plaintiff in a
replevin action. The court held that the Illinois certificate of title was
entitled to full faith and credit; that it must be recognized to the same
extent that an Ohio certificate would be recognized; and that under the
Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law6 a thief cannot convey valid
title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser although the cer-
tificate of title used appears valid on its face. The court distinguished
Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler7 a distinction not adhered to by a minority of
the court.
CONTRACTS
Another case on the fringe so far as conflict of laws is concerned is
Kemp v. Darke County Farm Bureau.8 Defendant, an Ohio corporation,
entered into a contract with plaintiff. The contract was made and to be
performed in Indiana. Defendant was not qualified to do business in
Indiana. However, the Indiana law did not make the contract void, but
merely prohibited such a corporation from maintaining an action in
Indiana. Inasmuch as the contract was valid by Indiana law, the court
held that the action could be maintained.
1. 114 Ohio App. 429, 182 N.E.2d 862 (1961).
2. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1934).
3. 114 Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E.2d 804 (1961).
4. 173 Ohio St. 387, 183 N.E.2d 135 (1962).
5. OHIo REV. CODE § 4505.01-.19.
6. Ibid.
7. 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951).
8. 115 Ohio App. 1, 184 N.E.2d 103 (1961).
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PLACE OF TORT
"The law of the place (the territorial area) in which an act occurs
has traditionally been said to determine whether the act is tortious."'9 In
Conway v. Ogier ° the court applied the rule to a malpractice action. An
Ohio woman was operated on in New York, and the court held that the
place of injury for the malpractice action was New York. In the same
case the court had the more difficult problem of deciding the situs of a
cause of action for loss of consortium, brought by the husband, who had
remained in Ohio at all times. After observing that no case in point had
been found, the court held that New York was the situs of the tort, since
New York's interest in negligent conduct occurring there is a stronger
daim than Ohio's interest, which rests only on the domicile of the couple.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Conway v. Ogiert " also contains an unusual statute of limitations
problem. It will be recalled that the case involved alleged malpractice
committed in New York. When the doctor sued in Ohio for the value
of his services, the defendant counterclaimed for malpractice. The coun-
terclaim was brought after the expiration of both the Ohio and the New
York statutes, the Ohio being one year and the New York two years.
However, by Ohio law the statute of limitations does not bar cross-de-
mands or recoupment without affirmative relief, whereas by New York
law it does. The court held that the law of Ohio governs. Limitations
are procedural and controlled by the law of the forum. The right to use
a claim as a cross-demand or recoupment is the same in its nature as the
right to obtain affirmative relief. Hence, such a right should also be
classified as procedural. The Ohio Borrowing Statute " applies the for-
eign statute only when the limitation is to a lesser period than Ohio's.
Here the New York limitation is longer. As a result, cross-demands ani
recoupment are not barred.
FLETCHER R. ANDREws
9. LBFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAws § 110 (1959).
10. 115 Ohio App. 251, 184 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
11. Supra note 10.
12. OHIo REv. CODE § 2305.20.
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